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CASE COMMENTS
APPELLATE PROCEDURE-TimD CImRUT INVOKES RES
IPSA LOQUITUR IN FELA CASE To SUSTAIN JURY VERDICT FOR
PLAINTIFF, ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF DID NOT RAISE THE DOCTRINE
Plaintiff instituted an action under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act,' alleging that defendant was negligent in that it "should have known
of the [defective mechanism and] . . . failed to make proper repairs." 2
The plaintiff at no time explicitly mentioned the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur; the defendant limited its defense to the question of damages.
The district court instructed the jury that to be liable the defendant
must have had actual or constructive knowledge of the defective mechanism
prior to the accident. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and the
trial court, on defendant's motion, granted a new trial 3 which resulted in a
verdict for the defendant. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, en
banc, with two judges dissenting, held that the evidence presented a res
ipsa loquitur situation which justified the inference of negligence. The
court reinstated the verdict of the first trial, even though the doctrine had
not been raised at either trial below. The court stated that res ipsa loquitur
was in the case from the moment the complaint was filed ....
[It is] simply a rule of evidence . . .. [And] it does not have
to be pleaded . . . or "noticed" by specific designation to the
adverse party at pre-trial or at trial, since it is neither a cause of
action nor a ground for recovery, nor an "issue." 4
Fassbinder v. Pennsylvania R.R., 322 F.2d 859 (3d Cir. 1963) (en banc),
reversing 193 F. Supp. 767 (W.D. Pa. 1961).
The federal courts have often applied a federal doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur in FELA cases,5 as well as in other cases arising under federal
regulatory schemes, 6 but have never elucidated their interpretation of the
doctrine. In tort law, the majority view explains res ipsa loquitur as a
factual situation from which a jury may infer negligence on the part of the
defendant; 7 under this view, res ipsa loquitur is nothing more than a Latin
135 Stat 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-53 (1958).
2 Fassbinder v. Pennsylvania R.R., 193 F. Supp. 767, 768 (W.D. Pa. 1961).
3 Fassbinder v. Pennsylvania R.R., supra note 2.
4 Instant case at 863.
6 See, e.g., Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500 (1957); Jesionowski v.
Boston & Me. R.R., 329 U.S. 452 (1947).
6 See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 46 (1948).
7 See, e.g., Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500 (1957); Jesionowski v.
Boston & Me. R.R., 329 U.S. 452 (1947).
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name for one kind of inferential prooL8 However, different views on the
effect of res ipsa loquitur on burden of proof 9 and on apposite factual situa-
tions for the doctrine's application betray the equivocal nature of the con-
cept. An important requirement under the majority view is that "the
occurrence be one which ordinarily does not happen without negligence." 10
Where the probabilities are such that this condition is met, the case is
equated to any other case in which the missing link in the chain of evidence
is supplied by circumstantial evidence."
A minority view asserts, however, that in many cases "the facts are not
nearly so pointed and the adoption of any premise as to the balance of
probabilities . . . is the sheerest 'leap of faith'." 2 Thus, the applica-
tion of the doctrine in these cases is explained as being attributable "to the
strong general trend towards strict liability and social insurance . . . ." 'a
Furthermore, in res ipsa loquitur cases, the plaintiff often has no sufficient
way to prove that the defendant was negligent. Thus, under this view, an
obvious purpose of the doctrine is to assist a claimant in proving negligence
where the accident itself is some evidence of negligence, as well as in the
cases where negligence is more probable than not, and the defendant can
more reasonably be called upon for an explanation. 14 Under these ra-
tionales, res ipsa loquitur takes on independent significance as a theory of
negligence; it does not merely allow a jury to draw inferences from estab-
lished basic facts. Indeed, it results in "doubtful postulates favorable to
liability in many situations where the courts would otherwise be under-
standably reluctant to adopt them .... ." 1r
s MoRRis, TORTS § 8, at 137 (1953) ; see PROSSER, TORTS § 42, at 211 (2d ed. 1955).
9 Besides the "permissible inference" theory, at least two other theories of res
ipsa loquitur have been advanced by the courts. Some courts have held that res ipsa
loquitur creates a presumption, which always requires a directed verdict for the
plaintiff if the defendant offers no evidence to rebut the presumption. See Schechter v.
Hann, 305 Ky. 794, 205 S.W.2d 690 (1947) ; Kearner v. Charles S. Tanner Co., 31
I.L 203, 76 Atl. 833 (1910) ; Carpenter, The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur in Cali-
fornia, 10 So. CAL. L. REv. 166 (1937). A few courts have gone further, and have
held that res ipsa loquitur shifts the ultimate burden of proof to the defendant. See
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Mattice, 219 Ark. 428, 243 S.W.2d 15 (1951).
10 See PROSSER, TORTS § 42, at 201 (2d ed. 1955). Prosser's two other require-
ments for the application of the doctrine are: "(2) it must be caused by an agency
or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; (3) it must not have
been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff." Ibid.
12 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 19.5, at 1078 (1956).
12 Ibid.
13 Id. at 1080.
'4 2 MoORE, F DmRL PRacricE f 8.12, at 1686 (2d ed. 1957). This is somewhat
exemplified by the earlier rule that when the plaintiff alleged specific allegations of
negligence, he waived his right to rely on res ipsa loquitur. See 2 HARPER & JAMES,
TORTS § 19.10, at 1096 (1956); Knepper, Pleading in Res Ipsa Loquitur Cases, 23
OHIo ST. L.J. 450, 456-59 (1962); 22 MD. L. REv. 174 (1962), But cf. PROSSER,
TORTS § 42, at 209 (2d ed. 1955).
15 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 19.5, at 1079. For cases where the probabilities
of negligence are questionable see Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 46 (1948)
(res ipsa loquitur applied) ; McEwen v. Spokane Int'l R.R., 325 F.2d 491 (9th Cir.
1963) (court held that the trial judge was justified in not giving the requested res
ipsa loquitur instruction; strong possibility of outside interference rather than negli-
gence on the part of the defendant); Kleinman v. Banner Laundry Co., 150 Minn.
515, 517-18, 186 N.W. 123, 124 (1921) (res ipsa loquitur applied); Galbraith v.
Busch, 267 N.Y. 230, 196 N.E. 36 (1935) (res ipsa loquitur not applied).
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The problem in the instant case centers about the court's failure to
define its concept of res ipsa loquitur. The plaintiff attributed the accident
to the breaking off of a six inch piece of brake shaft.16 There would appear
to be at least four possible causes of the accident. The mechanism might
be a type which gradually erodes and thus a periodic reasonable inspection
would have disclosed the defect. It might be a mechanism with a very
short useful life, and thus, a prudent replacement program would be neces-
sary to prevent such damage. On the other hand, the equipment might have
a very long life and damage could only be caused by an unusual jolt. Since
such a jolt might have occurred immediately prior to the accident, it is
possible that no reasonable inspection and no reasonable replacement pro-
gram would have prevented the accident. The same is true if the mecha-
nism had become faulty due to tampering by an unauthorized person, such as
a passenger or vandal.
The plaintiff offered no evidence pertaining to the characteristic of the
mechanism. If the court, in the instant case, was applying the majority
theory of res ipsa loquitur, it seems that the alleged facts did not support
the conclusion that this was the type of case in which it is more probable
than not that the accident was caused by negligence. 1 While the court
seemed to espouse the majority formula,' it made no attempt to analyze
the facts of the case in light of that formula. Of course, if the inference to
be drawn was only the result of a rational process to span gaps in the
explicit evidence,19 no instruction would be necessary,20 and the court's
action in reinstating the first verdict was correct.
Despite apparent reliance on the majority view, it seems that the
court, in light of the facts of the case and the lack of proof showing that
the injury was probably caused by negligence, was invoking the minority
view of the doctrine in light of extrinsic considerations.2 ' But once
extrinsic considerations are brought into play, absent an instruction, a jury
verdict in favor of the plaintiff in this case is against the weight of the
evidence.
Although on appeal from a final judgment following the second trial
ordered by the lower court, the appellant may claim error in the granting
of the new trial and, if the appellate court agrees, it may reinstate the
verdict reached in the first trial,22 a difficult problem arises when the new
16 Record, pp. 21-26.
17 See text accompanying note 10 supra.
18 See instant case at 863-64.
19 See MORGAN, MAGUIRE & WEINsTEIN, EVIDENCE 326 (4th ed. 1957).
20 If the only effect of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine is to give a technical
Latin name to a special kind of circumstantial proof, there is seldom any
reason for mentioning the doctrine to the jury . . . . If standard instruc-
tions are given in a res ipsa case, claimant's counsel can then make a legiti-
mate argument on the weight and nature of his circumstantial proof.
MoRRis, TORTS § 8, at 137 (1953).
21 See text accompanying notes 12-15 supra.
22 See, e.g., American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wilson-Keith & Co., 247 F.2d 249
(8th Cir. 1957) ; Standard Oil Co. v. Brown, 238 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1956) ; 3 BARRON
& HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE & PRocEDuRE § 1302.1, at 346 (Wright ed. 1958).
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trial was granted because the verdict was allegedly against the weight of the
evidence2 Three lines of approach have been offered in determining
whether the first judgment should be allowed to stand. Some courts appear
to give the trial court almost unlimited discretion in granting or denying
a new trialU 4 A second line of approach is that the first judgment will be
upheld unless it is quite clear that the jury reached a seriously erroneous
result. 25 The strictest test enunciated is that the verdict must be mani-
festly and palpably against the verdict before the first verdict will be set
aside.26 In Lind v. Schenley Indus., Inc.,2 7 the Third Circuit became the
first court of appeals to reverse an order of the trial court granting a new
trial on the grounds that the verdict was against the weight of the evi-
dence. 8 The court stated that "such an action effects a denigration of the
jury system and to the extent that new trials are granted the judge takes
over, if he does not usurp, the prime function of the jury as the trier of the
facts." 2 Without definitely limiting itself to one of the three tests, the
court stated that the "seriously erroneous result" test is logical and
persuasive. 30
Even applying the apparently strict test in Lind, it would appear that
the district court properly granted a new trial. A jury would have been
justified in returning a verdict for the plaintiff if it had been instructed on
the expanded concept of res ipsa loquitur,3 but the absence of such an
instruction makes the verdict irrational when the doctrine is invoked for
extrinsic considerations.8 2  It seems inappropriate to rely on an irrational
verdict to support a finding that a properly instructed jury might have
made. While it may be contended that if the first jury strained so hard
23 Id. § 1302.1, at 348; 13 STAN. L. REv. 383, 384-85 (1961).
24 See, e.g., McEwen v. Spokane Intl R.R., 325 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1963) ; Murphy
v. United States Dist. Ct., 145 F.2d 1018, 1020 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 891
(1944) ; Grayson v. Deal, 85 F. Supp. 431, 435 (N.D. Ala. 1949) ; cf. Zegan v. Central
R.R., 266 F.2d 101 (3d Cir. 1959) (by implication).
256 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACtiCE ff 59.08, at 3819 (2d ed. 1953); see Pelham v.
Hendricks, 132 F. Supp. 774 (M.D. Pa. 1955); Schirra v. Delaware, L. & W. R-R.,
103 F. Supp. 812, 820 (M.D. Pa. 1952).
26 See, e.g., Miller v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 17 F.R.D. 121, 125 (W.D. Mich.
1954), aff'd, 228 F.2d 889 (6th Cir. 1955) ; American Cooler Co. v. Fay & Scott, 20
F. Supp. 782, 783 (D. Me. 1937).
27278 F.2d 79 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 835 (1960), 13 STAN.
L. REv. 383 (1961).
2 8 See 3 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1302.1 (Wright
ed. Supp. 1963, at 129) (semble).
29278 F.2d 79, 90 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 822 (1960).
30 Id. at 89. But see Zegan v. Central R, 266 F.2d 101 (3d Cir. 1959).
31 If there had been an instruction on the doctrine, a rational jury might have
held for either party; this expanded concept of res ipsa loquitur allows a not strictly
rational inference to be made, but it does not compel a result. See, e.g., Sweeney v.
Erving, 228 U.S. 233, 240 (1913) ; United States v. Hull, 195 F.2d 64, 66 (1st Cir.
1952).
32 There is no indication in the court's opinion that absent the application of res
ipsa loquitur the trial judge would have erred in deciding that the verdict was against
the clear weight of the evidence. Since the jury was charged in normal preponderance
of the evidence terms, it is quite likely that the jury reached their verdict despite the
weight of the evidence or the judge's instruction.
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to render a verdict for the plaintiff, the res ipsa loquitur instruction only
would have given it a legitimate ground for its decision, and it certainly
would have returned a verdict for the plaintiff, this argument assumes some
reason behind an apparently irrational verdict. Moreover, granting the
obvious jury reason-a sympathy for injured parties as against large public
carriers-, a rational jury, made aware that the law is also attuned to these
considerations, might sift the evidence with a less sympathetic bias for the
plaintiff.
The defendant in the instant case may also be prejudiced by lack of
notice.as The defendant, relying on the majority view of res ipsa loquitur,
might have decided that this case was outside the scope of the doctrine, and
thus believed it completely unnecessary to rebut the postulate that this was
the type of accident which probably was caused by negligence. On the facts
of the instant case, it is quite probable that defendant did not present such
evidence because it had no way of knowing that the verdict for the plaintiff
would be upheld on this theory. Since the plaintiff had already been given
two opportunities to prove his case, and failed to utilize properly either
the majority or minority concept of res ipsa loquitur, and, since it can be
argued that no error was committed at the second trial, the second verdict
should have been upheld.
COPYRIGHTS-SOLUTIONS TO QUESTIONS IN A COPYRIGHTED
PHYSIcS TEXTBOOK HELD AN INFRINGEMENT
The corporate plaintiff published and secured copyrights upon two
physics textbooks written by the individual plaintiffs. These books con-
tained application problems at the end of each chapter but provided only
quantitative answers to odd-numbered problems. The plaintiffs did not
publish complete solutions because they feared that many college professors
would not use a text in which all problems were solved.' After unsuccess-
fully seeking permission from plaintiffs, the defendant published and sold
to a number of college book stores a manual of solutions to plaintiffs' prob-
lems. The answers were numbered to correspond to plaintiffs' text and
contained the appropriate mathematical calculations plus some commentary;
there was very little use of the actual language of plaintiffs' questions.2 In
a suit alleging copyright infringement and unfair competition, the District
3a Although it does not seem necessary for the plaintiff's pleadings to put the
defendant on notice that he is relying on res ipsa loquitur, it would appear that
requiring the plaintiff to inform the defendant of such reliance at a preliminary stage
of the trial, preferably pretrial, is a slight burden. See Wiles v. New York, C. &
St. L. R.R., 283 F.2d 328, 330 n.1 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 900 (1960).
I Instant case at 222. The apparent reason is that the professors used such prob-
lems for homework assignments, classroom exercises, and examinations. Plaintiffs'
Trial Memorandum, p. 2.
2 Id. at 7; instant case at 223.
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Court for the Eastern District of New York granted a permanent injunc-
tion 3 under the Copyright Act.4 Addison-Wesley Publishing Co. v. Brown,
223 F. Supp. 219 (E.D.N.Y. 1963).
Copying would have been apparent in the present case if the answers
had repeated the questions; 5 difficulty arises from the fact that although
the defendant concededly used plaintiffs' textbook in arranging his work,6
his manual of solutions contained little actual lifting of plaintiffs' language.7
The case can be approached on the theory that the copyright on plaintiffs'
questions covers any answers which are "implicit" in the problems. This
necessitates an inquiry into the nature of the questions-if a question has
only one correct answer, that answer can be regarded as part of the ques-
tion,8 so that any publication of it would constitute a copy. The courts
seldom have confronted the concept of a response to or a result of a copy-
righted work being contained in that workY They have considered the
more general problem of the alleged infringement being in a different form
or medium,' 0 and in these cases usually have been slow to afford protection
3 The plaintiffs had already secured a temporary injunction based on an unfair
competition theory. Addison-Wesley Publishing Co. v. Brown, 207 F. Supp. 678 (E.D.
N.Y. 1962, 31 U. CiNc. L. REv. 473 (1962).
4 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1958).
5 See Reed v. Holliday, 19 Fed. 325 (W.D. Pa. 1884). The statutory basis
would be 17 U.S.C. § 1(a) (1958). The plaintiffs did urge at trial an infringement
based on § 1(b) that the solutions had infringed their exclusive right to "make any
other version" of the questions. The inclusion of this contention should not aid the
plaintiffs, because the tests for an infringement under that section of the act are the
same as those used to establish a "copying." See Corcoran v. Montgomery Ward
& Co., 121 F.2d 572 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 687 (1941); MacMillan
Co. v. King, 223 Fed. 862 (D. Mass. 1914); G. Ricordi & Co. v. Mason, 201 Fed.
184 (S.D.N.Y. 1912), aff'd per curiam, 210 Fed. 277 (2d Cir. 1913).
The plaintiffs also maintained under § 1 (b) that the defendant's solutions infringed
their exclusive right "to translate" the questions "into other languages.' "To trans-
late" has its obvious literary meaning, which involves a parallel reproduction of another
work. See Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 104 n.21 (2d
Cir. 1951) ; cf. Brecht v. Bently, 185 F. Supp. 890, 894 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). To include
translation by means of a mathematical language would exceed any legislative purpose
in this section; Congress was merely codifying the common law as it existed prior
to 1909, and has not modified the section since. See Loew's, Inc. v. Columbia Broad-
casting Sys., Inc., 131 F. Supp. 165, 178 n.33 (S.D. Cal. 1955). A determination of
whether the resulting work was implicit in the original-see text accompanying note 8
infra-would make it unnecessary to decide whether mathematics is a language, yet
still offer protection for literary translations.
6 Cf. Caddy-Imler Creations, Inc. v. Caddy, 299 F.2d 79, 81 (9th Cir. 1962):
"We know not what appellant means by the phrase 'derived from' as distinguished
from 'copied'."
7 Instant case at 222-23.
8 For an example of answers which seem not to be implicit in the questions
because they are susceptible to much original research and several answers differing
in accordance with individual premises, see Kurland, Book Review, 67 HARv. L. REv.
906 (1954). In addition, although the reviewer goes so far as to lift the actual
questions from HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
(1953), his limited use in a book review could be considered a "fair use." See note
35 infra. Compare University of London Press, Ltd. v. University Tutorial Press,
Ltd., [1916] 2 Ch. 601.
9 Cf. cases cited in note 28 infra.
1o Although the alleged copy contains substantial changes, such as paraphrasing,
see Ansehl v. Puritan Pharmaceutical Co., 61 F.2d 131 (8th Cir. 1932), if it is in essen-
tially the same form as the original, a copying will be more readily found. See, e.g.,
Holdredge v. Knight Publishing Corp., 214 F. Supp. 921 (S.D. Cal. 1963) (tvo
books).
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to the original work in the absence of a specific statutory provision., The
treatment accorded a musical score offers an instructive comparison since
the resulting sounds are in response to the notations on the score, as the
answers are in response to the questions. Although copyrighting a musical
score 12 protects against a recording or any public performance for profit, 13
this protection is based upon section l(e) of the Copyright Act, which
expressly refers to these modes of reproducing the music, thereby making
the change in medium irrelevant. 14 Prior to its enactment, reproduction of
a song on a player piano roll had been held not to be an infringing copy; 15
the general language of section 1 (a) -giving the exclusive right "to print,
reprint, publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted work"-being effective only
to preclude tracking of the notations. 16  However, section 1(a) has been
used to afford an author protection against the transformation of a cartoon
strip character into a doll 17 and a book into a silent movie.' 8 In both of
these cases the finding of copying was facilitated by the courts' ability to
see the similarity between the two works. An answer is in a different form
from the question; but both are in the medium of written symbols, so that
the adoption by defendant of plaintiffs' formulation and symbols could be
detected.'2
Assuming that the solutions manual can be regarded as a copy on the
theory that the solutions are embodied in the questions, a more basic issue
remains-whether the solutions are copyrightable. A copyright monopoly 2
0
gives an "author" 21 exclusive rights to his mode of expression but does not
preclude the use of his ideas by others.&2 2 Since scientific and other non-
11 See text accompanying note 15 infra. Compare cases cited in notes 17-18 infra.
1217 U.S.C. § 5(e) (1958).
13 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1958). See Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591 (1917).
1417 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1958).
15White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908) (not
only different in form-the court could not see the similarity between the two works).
16 See Beban II v. Decca Records, Inc., 169 F. Supp. 829, 831 (S.D. Cal. 1959)
(dictum).
'7 See, e.g., Fleischer Studios v. Freundlich, 73 F.2d 276 (2d Cir. 1934), cert.
denied, 294 U.S. 717 (1935). See generally Umbreit, A Consideration of Copyright,
87 U. PA. L. REv. 932, 934-51 (1939).
18 Kalem v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911).
19 However, the similarity probably could not be readily detected by one un-
familiar with physics, just as the similarity between the original work and a trans-
lation into another language is visible only to one familiar with both languages.
Prior to the specific protection of 17 U.S.C. § 1(b) (1958), a translation was not
considered a copy of the original, because the author only received exclusive rights
to the language or form in which he copyrighted it. See Stowe v. Thomas, 23 Fed.
Cas. 201 (No. 13514) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853).
20 See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). "The sole interest of the
United States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general
benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors. It is said that reward to
the author or artist serves to induce release to the public of the products of his
creative genius." United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948).
21 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 4, 26 (1958).
22 See Caddy-Imler Creations, Inc. v. Caddy, 299 F.2d 79, 81-82 (9th Cir. 1962)
(two arithmetic courses) ; Brief English Sys., Inc. v. Owen, 48 F.2d 555 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 283 U.S. 858 (1931) (two speedwriting courses). See generally Yank-
wich, Legal Protection of Ideas-A Judge's Approach, 43 VA. L. Rxv. 375 (1957).
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literary works contain much material that is considered within the public
domain because it is essentially utilitarian or so beneficial to the community
as to render a private monopoly detrimental,23 courts have emphasized the
actual appropriation of language in finding an infringement of these works. 24
Similarly, while architectural plans are afforded protection by the act against
unauthorized reproduction of the plans,2 5 the resulting structure is encom-
passed by the copyright on the plans only if it is deemed a "work of art".26
A building which is primarily functional rather than esthetic 27 will not
infringe the plans because the copyright does not prevent appropriation of a
useful idea.28 Applying these criteria to the present case, the response which
each of the plaintiffs' questions is designed to evoke from the student and the
educational process which each question and answer involves should not be
copyrightable. Each response in itself is merely an embodiment of scientific
principles. While the plaintiffs' sequence and organization of questions can
be argued to represent their own expression, 2 9 and can be asserted to have
been appropriated by defendant's systematic answering, they are in essence
a careful conception of how best to teach the subject matter. These should
be freely available to the public not subject to monopoly.30 The specific
numbers, angles, dimensions, and facts selected by plaintiffs for the problems
and incorporated in the answers might be argued to be subject to copyright,
but they seem too trivial in themselves to be given protection,8' 1 just as the
arrangement of cards in a particular hand in a copyrighted bridge instruc-
tion manual were held unprotected from copying by a bridge columnist 2
23 Cf. 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(a) (1960).
24 See, e.g., Baker v. Seldon, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (slight rearrangement of forms
in the original accounting textbook held not an infringement); Greenbie v. Noble,
151 F. Supp. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (history books held no infringement of book based
on same historical incident) ; Russell v. Northeastern Publishing Co., 7 F. Supp. 571
(D. Mass. 1934) (bridge problem based on same scheme as original held no in-
fringement) ; note 21 mspra; note 33 infra. See generally BALL, LAW OF COPYRIGHT
AND LITERARY PROPERTY 296 (1944); Kalodner & Vance, The Relation Between
Federal and State Protection of Literary and Artistic Property, 72 H~Av. L. REv.
1079, 1105 (1959).
2517 U.S.C. § 5(i) (1958). See May v. Bray, 30 Copyright Dec. (Copyright
Office Bull.) 435 (S.D. Cal. 1955). See generally Strauss, Copyright in Architectural
Works, in U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE FOR SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEmARKS, AND
COPYRIGHTS, SENATE COM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., COPYRIGHT
LAW REVISION, Study No. 27, at 69 (Comm. Print 1959).
26 See Jones Bros. Co. v. Underkoffier, 16 F. Supp. 729 (M.D. Pa. 1936); 17
U.S.C. §§ 1(b), 5(g) (1958).
27Compare 37 C.F.R. §202.10(a) (1960), woith 37 C.F.R. §2 02.10(c) (1960).
28Muller v. Triborough Bridge Authority, 43 F. Supp. 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1942)
(corprighted plan to a bridge approach) ; cf. National Cloak & Suit Co. v. Standard
Mail Order Co., 191 Fed. 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1911). See generally Strauss, supra note 25.
29 Cf. Gelles-Widmer Co. v. Milton Bradley Co., 313 F.2d 143 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 373 U.S. 913 (1963) (copying the combination and arrangements of flash cards
held an infringement) ; Nikanov v. Simon & Schuster, 246 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1957)
(copying the unique format of a Russian language textbook held an infringement).
30 See, e.g., Baker v. Seldon, 101 U.S. 99 (1879). But cf. 17 U.S.C. § 7 (1958)
(protection for the compilation of works within the public domain).
31 See Kane v. Pennsylvania Broadcasting Co., 73 F. Supp. 307 (D. Pa. 1947).
But cf. Triangle Publications, Inc. v. New England Newspaper Publication Co., 46
F. Supp. 198 (D. Mass. 1942) (racing form notations held copyrightable).
32 Russell v. Northeastern Publishing Co., 7 F. Supp. 571 (D. Mass. 1934).
1964]
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The cases which have upheld the rights of the author of an educational work
against one who copied his organization have involved considerable appro-
priation of language as well as format.
33
In finding defendant's solutions an infringement because they were an
"unfair use",3 4 the court in the present case placed premature emphasis on
the possibility of plaintiffs' losing textbook sales. This consideration should
not become significant until the statutory requisite of a "copying" of copy-
rightable material has been demonstrated and the defendant has raised a
"fair use" defense 3 5 Similarly, while it is difficult to conceive of a suc-
cessful fair use defense on the facts of the present case, 38 a court's reasons
for rejecting a defendant's fair use contentions 3 need not be expressed until
the plaintiff has met his burden of proving a copying. The court's use of the
phrase "unfair use" perpetuates a nebulous concept in the copyright law; 38
33 See, e.g., MacMillan Co. v. King, 223 Fed. 862 (D. Mass. 1914) (outlines of
an economics textbook held an infringement) ; Reed v. Holliday, 19 Fed. 325 (W.D.
Pa. 1884) (copying of problem-sentences into a teacher's manual held an infringe-
ment of the textbook) ; cf. College Entrance Book Co. v. Amsco Book Co., 119 F.2d
874 (2d Cir. 1941) (one French examination copied another). Compare Colonial
Book Co. v. Oxford Book Co., 45 F. Supp. 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1942), aff'd, 135 F.2d
463 (2d Cir. 1943) (special arrangement of chapters in a chemistry book held not
copyrightable), with Nikanov v. Simon & Schuster, 246 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1957).
In the Nikanov case, the plaintiffs' concededly unique presentation of the Russian
language, as well as cognate words and mnemonic drawings, were copied by defendant's
textbook. The court, in considering the copyrightability of this matter, admitted
that the case was on the "borderline," id. at 504, but held that the cases cited above
compelled the finding of infringement.
34 Instant case at 226.
35 This term has been read into the act. See, e.g., Bradbury v. Columbia Broad-
casting Sys., Inc., 287 F.2d 478 (9th Cir.), petition for cert. dismissed, 368 U.S. 801
(1961); Karll v. Curtis Publishing Co., 39 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Wis. 1941). Compare
Toksvig v. Bruce Publishing Co., 181 F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 1950). See generally
Cooper, Wihtol v. Crow: Fair Use Revisited, 11 U.C.L.A.L. Rr-v. 56 (1963). How-
ever, it has never been accurately defined. See Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104
F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939). See generally NIMMER, COPYRIGHT § 145 (1963);
Cohen, Fair Use in the Law of Copyright, in ASCAP, SIXTH COPYRIGHT LAW
SYMPosium 43 (1955).
A specific example of fair use is the "insubstantiality" of the copying. See
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930) (quantitatively);
Wihtol v. Wells, 231 F.2d 550, 553 (7th Cir. 1956) (qualitatively). When the
copying represents valid criticism, it is also fair use. Cf. Consumers Union of United
States v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 189 F. Supp. 275, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) ; Columbia Pic-
tures Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co., 137 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Cal. 1955). How-
ever, a copied work will not normally be held a fair use if it undermines the market-
ability of the protected work. See, e.g., Public Affairs Associates v. Rickover, 284
F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1960), vacated for isuffcient record, 369 U.S. 111 (1962);
Hill v. Whalen & Martell, Inc., 220 Fed. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1914). But see Henry Holt
& Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Pa. 1938). Compare
Loew's, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D. Cal. 1955),
aff'd sub noi. Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd by equally
divided court, 356 U.S. 43 (1958). See generally Yankwich, What Is Fair Use?,
22 U. CHL L. REv. 203 (1954).
36 See Cooper, supra note 35, at 62-63.
37 See, e.g., Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1962) (verbatim copy);
Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Pa. 1938)
(commercial use of plaintiff's work).
38 See generally BALL, LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 293-318 (1944).
The author cites several cases for the proposition that an "unfair use" may be an in-
fringement under the act. But these cases also involved extensive lifting of the plain-
tiff's language. "Unfair use" was used by the court in Nutt v. National Institute, Inc.,
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in addition, it serves to confuse an area of the law already burdened by
labels, particularly because copyright claims are so frequently joined with
allegations of unfair competition.
Because of the difficulty in establishing an infringement, consideration
should be given to the possibilities for an unfair competition recovery.
Although the plaintiffs in the present case had sectired a temporary injunc-
tion based on the theory of utnfair competition,39 the facts do not fit easily
into any of the generally recognized classes of this cause of action.40 The
works of the plaintiffs and defendant are not competitive, and while plain-
tiffs' names were printed on the cover of defendatnt's manual, there was in-
sufficient evidence that the public was confused as to the source of the
answers. t Unfair competition actiols often involve facts similar to those
in copyright litigation 42 and it has beett asserted-with reinforcement from
a recent Supreme Court dictum ift Sears, Roebuck & Co. 'v. Stiffel Co.43 -
that courts should hesitate in granting statt unfair competition protection
to works which are susceptible to copyright ptotection but have failed to
qualify for some particular reason. While this may be cortect as to works
which Congress appeared to have omitted purposely from the Copyright
Act 4 4 or on which the copyright term had expired 45 it seems inapplicable
to a work or element of a work which is not within the scope of the act at
31 F.2d 236, 237 (2d Cir. 1929), but it was in answer to the defense of fair use.
Cf. Wihtol v. Crow, 199 F. Supp. 682 (S.D. Iowa 1961), rev'd, 309 F.2d 777 (8th
Cir. 1962) (in not finding a copying, court emphasized plaintiff's unfair treatment
of defendant).
39 See note 3 stpra.
40 See generally CALLMANN, UNFAIk COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS (2d ed.
1950); Calmanrmi He Who Reaps Where He Has Not Sown, 55 HA6. L. REV. 595
(1942) ; Chaffee, Unfair Competition, 53 HARV. L. REV. 1289 (1940) ; Sell, The
Doctrine of Misappropriation in Unfair Competition, 11 VAiy. L. REv. 483 (1958);
Stern & Hoffman, Public Injury and the Putblic Interest. Secondary feidning ii the
Law of Unfair Competition, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 935 (1962) ; Developzenzts in the
Law-Competitive Torts, 77 HARv. L. REV. 888 (1964).
41 The cotrt did find that on at least one occasion defendant misrepresented that
the manual was being issued with the consent of the copyright proprietor. Instant
case at 222. Compare Taussig v. Wellington Fund, Inc., 313 F.2d 472 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 374 U.S. 806 (1963); Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34
(2d Cir. 1945).
42 See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1958). Compare Detective Comics, Inc. v. Bruns
Publications, Inc., 111 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1940) (copyright action-Superman), with
Fisher v. Star Co., 231 N.Y. 414, 132 N.E. 133, cert. denied, 257 U.S. 654 (1921)
(unfair competition action-Mutt & Jeff),
43 84 Sup. Ct. 784 (1964). In holding that a lamp which had failed to establish
the necessary novelty requirement for a patent could not then receive protection
against a copyist under an Illinois unfair competition action, Mr. Justice Black
stated that this principle operated as to the copyright law also. However, the Patent
Act's monopoly has always been given less freely and on different standards from
copyright protection. See generally Silverman, The Copyright Halo: A Comparison
of Judicial Standards for Copyrights and Patents, 23 U. PiTT. L. REV. 137 (1961).
44 See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 664 (2d
Cir. 1955) (L. Hand, J., dissenting); RCA v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir.)
(L. Hand, J.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 712 (1940) (artist's recorded performance).
See generally Kalodner & Vance, supka note 24.
45 See G. Ricordi & Co. v. Haendler, 194 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1952) (expiration
of copyright term).
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all because not a mode of expression but an idea. A state has interests in
regulating market behavior which are independent of the policy of giving
incentive to certain kinds of creativity.4 6 It has been urged that since the
unfair competition theory was developed to protect the public, 47 it should
not be extended to private rights when there has been no allegation of public
harm.48 However, the defendant is securing a "free ride" in the sense that
the manual of solutions, which plainly has no independent marketability,
derives success from the widespread use of plaintiffs' textbook. The
manual's reliance on plaintiff-authors' scholarly effort and plaintiff-
publisher's selling success, coupled with its harmful effect on the textbook's
marketability,49 should be enough to state a version of unfair competition. 50
COSTS-FEDERA-L DISTRICT COURT HAS DISCRETIONARY POWER
To TAX ACTUAL TRANSPORTATION EXPENSES OF WITNESSES WITH-
OUT REGARD TO 100-Mms LIMITATION
Following reversal of a verdict directed for defendant in an action
for breach of plaintiff's employment contract, defendant won a jury verdict,
but the court, in taxing costs against plaintiff, refused actual expenses,
awarded after the first trial, for transportation of defense witnesses from
Saudi Arabia. Relying on its discretion, it allowed only 8 cents per mile
compensation, limited to 100 miles. In a five-to-four decision on appeal,
the Second Circuit held that to refuse reimbursement for witnesses' travel
expenses taxed by the first judge was an abuse of discretion. Farmer v.
Arabian Anz. Oil Co., 324 F.2d 359 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. granted, 32
U.S.L. WEEK 3314 (U.S. March 10, 1964) (Nos. 804, 808).
46 See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232 (1964) (dictum).
The thrust of the Court's statement may be that a state may force a defendant to
disclaim association with the complainant, but may not grant an injunction premised
solely on copying.
47 See Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 271 F.2d 569, 570-71 (2d
Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 919 (1960).
48 See Stern & Hoffman, supra note 40, at 966-71.
49 See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
50 State law is applicable to unfair competition claims. See Triangle Publications,
Inc. v. New England Newspaper Publication Co., 46 F. Supp. 198, 203 (D. Mass.
1942). This is true even though 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1948) provides for pendent
jurisdiction of copyright and unfair competition claims.
This action arose in New York, whose courts have been receptive to this type of
claim-protecting an individual's market without requiring a showing of public con-
fusion. See, e.g., Karr v. Leeds Music Corp., 126 U.S.P.Q. 27 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960) ;
Gieseking v. Urania Records, Inc., 17 Misc. 2d 1034, 155 N.Y.S.2d 171 (Sup. Ct.
1956); Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc.
786, 793, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483, 489 (Sup. Ct. 1950), af'd, 279 App. Div. 632, 107
N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951) ; cf. Vaudable v. Montmartre, Inc., 20 Misc. 2d 757, 193 N.Y.
S.2d 332 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
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In the federal courts, costs are taxed "as of course to the prevailing'
party" ' and include fees for witnesses.2 The courts, however, while tax-
ing witnesses' travel expenses at the statutory 8 cents per mile,3 have limited
taxation, without overt statutory authorization, to a distance not exceed-
ing the subpoena power of the district court.4 That power encompasses
any place within the district, or, if outside it, not more than 100 miles from
the place of trial or hearing. The Second Circuit in the present case
abolishes the limitation by holding, in accord with recent decisions of its
district courts,6 that there is no statutory justification for equating taxa-
tion with subpoena power. The circuit court declares that the many deci-
sions establishing the limit no longer retain vitality after the 1949 amend-
ment to section 1821 of the Judicial Code,7 which now entitles witnesses
traveling "to and from the continental United States" to their actual
expenses 8 in lieu of the usual mileage allowance of 8 cents.
I FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d). Expenses which are taxed "as of course!' will be taxed
by the clerk upon submission by the prevailing party of a properly filed bill of costs;
such expenses are allowed "unless the court otherwise directs." As to the procedure
involved see Peck, Taxation of Costs in United States District Courts, 42 NB. L.
REv. 788 (1963).
228 U.S.C. §1920(3) (1958). Section 1920 provides taxation for (1) clerk's
and marshal's fees, (2) cost of transcripts "necessarily obtained for use in the case,"
(3) expenses for witnesses and printing, (4) copies of papers necessarily obtained,
and (5) docket fees.
3 28 U.S.C. § 1821 (1958):
A witness attending in any court of the United States . . . shall receive
$4 for each day's attendance and for the time necessarily occupied in going
to and returning from the same, and 8 cents per mile for going from and
returning to his place of residence. . . . Provided, That in lieu of the mileage
allowance provided for herein, witnesses who are required to travel between
the Territories and possessions, or to and from the continental United States,
shall be entitled to the actual expenses of travel at the lowest first-class
rate available at the time of reservation for passage, by means of trans-
portation employed ....
See, e.g., Commerce Oil Ref. Corp. v. Miner, 198 F. Supp. 895 (D.R.I. 1961);
Lee v. Pennsylvania R.R., 93 F. Supp. 309 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
5 FED. R. Civ. P. 45(e) (1). In large districts, the area traveled within the
district may exceed the 100-mile limitation, but the greater distance will govern.
Thus in Kemart Corp. v. Printing Arts Research Labs., 232 F.2d 897 (9th Cir.
1956), the court taxed transportation expenses from point of entry into the district
for a witness coming from outside the district. Although the distance was 250 miles
from the district border to the place of trial, the court found the 100-mile limitation
inapplicable because the witness had been amenable to process immediately upon
entering the district.
6Bennett Chem. Co. v. Atlantic Commodities, Ltd., 24 F.R.D. 200 (S.D.N.Y.
1959); Maresco v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A., 167 F. Supp. 845 (E.D.
N.Y. 1958); Bank of America v. Loew's Int'l Corp., 163 F. Supp. 924 (S.D.N.Y.
1958). The only other decision in accord is Knox v. Anderson, 163 F. Supp. 822
(D. Hawaii 1958) (taxation of roundtrip airplane fare between Los Angeles and
Honolulu). Nineteenth-century authority in the First Circuit, Prouty v. Draper,
20 Fed. Cas. 13 (No. 11447) (C.C.D. Mass. 1842) (contra the 100-mile rule), was
criticized in The Governor Ames, 187 Fed. 40, 50 (1st Cir. 1910), and rejected in
Commerce Oil Ref. Corp. v. Miner, 198 F. Supp. 895, 899 (D.R.I. 1961).
728 U.S.C. § 1821 (1958).
s Numerous decisions since 1949, however, have confirmed the 100-mile rule.
See, e.g., Reynolds Metals Co. v. Yturbide, 258 F.2d 321, 335 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 840 (1958); Perlman v. Feldman, 116 F. Supp. 102, 115 (D. Conn. 1953),
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The established connection of subpoena and taxation power appears
more valid than the relation between taxation power and the witness-fee
statute suggested in the instant case. Section 1821 is not concerned with
the allocation between parties of expenses, but rather with payments to
witnesses. In granting to witnesses coming from abroad exact rather
than formulaic compensation for their transportation expenses, the amend-
ment involves no policy consideration as to who shall pay for this relief.Y
Its legislative history reveals no reference to distribution of statutory wit-
ness fees between the parties.'
Thus, no statute connects the court's taxation power with either its
subpoena authority or with the witness fee regulations of section 1821. A
relation in policy, however, may be found between the subpoena and taxa-
tion limitations, since they are justified by similar considerations of bal-
anced convenience: 11 the availability of depositions, the possibility of an
individual's appearing voluntarily, and the facility of judicial administration
resulting from a fixed rule making automatic the issuance of subpoenas and
the taxing of costs.12
rev'd on other grounds, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955);
Kenyon v. Automatic Instrument Co., 10 F.R.D 248 (W.D. Mich. 1950), aff'd, 186
F.2d 752 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 820 (1951); Spiritwood Grain Co. v.
Northern Pac. Ry., 179 F.2d 338, 344 (8th Cir. 1950) (dictum); Ryan v. Arabian
Am. Oil Co., 18 F.R.D. 206 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (dictum).
9 In addition to civil actions, § 1821 applies also to criminal and admiralty cases.
As amended, its main significance for the federal government is in criminal proceed-
ings: at the request of the Attorney General, courts may issue subpoenas to American
citizens resident in a foreign country (and not within the jurisdiction of any district
court), "tendering to the witness his necessary travel and attendance expenses."
28 U.S.C. § 1783(a) (b) (1958). See, e.g., In re Thompson, 213 F. Supp. 372, 373
(S.D.N.Y. 1963), in which an American citizen residing in the Philippines was
given a first-class round-trip airplane ticket between Manila and New York together
with a subpoena to return home for a grand jury hearing.
10 S. RzP. No. 187, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
11 The limitation on subpoena power does not derive from any concept of physical
judicial control-subpoenas run beyond the physical limits of the district. The Federal
Rules in fact preserved the old "100-mile limit" on subpoenas found in former 28
U.S.C. § 654. That statute prior to September 19, 1928, permitted subpoenas to run
beyond the 100-mile limit only if permission were received from the court "upon
proper application and cause shown." Act of Sept. 19, 1922, ch. 344, § 876, 42 Stat.
848 (1922), as amended (100-mile limit derived from Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22,
§ 6, 1 Stat 335). After Sept. 19, 1928, the present rule was in effect. At the time
of the adoption of the Federal Rules there was some sentiment in favor of discretion-
ary power in the district courts to issue subpoenas running without mileage limit into
other districts. A better guard against the arbitrariness of the mileage limitation
was believed to lie, however, in the automatic operation of federal statutes providing
for service of subpoenas without distance limitation; about twenty were in force at
that time. FED. R. Cirv. P. 45(e) (1), note (1947 ed.). Seminar-New Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure as Related to Judicial Procedure in Ohio, 13 U. CINc. L. REV.
1, 33-34 (1939). For a discussion of the importance of witness-convenience as a
factor see Di Lella v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 7 F.R.D. 192 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
12 Thus, rule 45(e) (1) provides for the issuance of subpoenas for hearings by
the clerk of the district court at the request of any party. The only limitation is
automatic, that of distance, to which the only exception is the specific authorization
of a federal statute providing for service at some other place. Such subpoenas are
not "as of course"; they issue only upon direct application not to the clerk but to
the court. For example, under § 307 of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act,
52 Stat. 1046 (1938), as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 337 (1958), a subpoena may be issued
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Even where the 100-mile limit prevents issuance of a subpoena to
compel attendance of a witness at a hearing or trial, subpoenas are available
to require attendance by the witness at a deposition proceeding in his own
district. 13 The advantages to a court of "live" witnesses are undeniable; 14
a witness' demeanor-his other-than-vocal response under "live" cross-
examination-aids in ascertaining the truth. Their disadvantages lie in
expense and inconvenience. In balancing these considerations, the Fed-
eral Rules have established the 100-mile limit as a barrier to compelled live
testimony.15 The Second Circuit by its present holding allows the district
court to tax transportation expenses for witnesses whose presence it could
not have compelled. The same policy which deems depositions sufficient
for purposes of proof despite their inferior testimonial value argues against
taxed expenses for long-distance witnesses. In both cases the individual
litigant retains the opportunity to bring in distant witnesses if he wishes to
and can do so.16
The Second Circuit in the present case purports "merely" to grant to
federal district judges the power to exercise their discretion in the alloca-
tion of such costs. 7 Such discretionary power in the district court, however,
involves a departure in judicial administration. The present litigation
opens taxation of costs, which has been "as of course," to partisan litigation.
Since taxation of travel expenses has been the task of the clerk, and ap-
pellate courts have refused to hear appeals on costs except for abuse of dis-
for any district. United States v. Arizona Canning Co., 212 F.2d 532 (10th Cir.
1954), held that in proceedings under that statute a trial court may tax as costs
travel expenses of witnesses in excess of the 100-mile limit, regardless of whether
subpoenas had been previously issued.
13iFED. R. Civ. P. 45(d) (1). It has been suggested that the cost of taking
depositions abroad may be no less than that of having witnesses come to this country
because of the expense involved in providing transportation for counsel to represent
opposing party, as provided in FED. R. Civ. P. 26(d). Bank of America v. Loew's
Int'l Corp., 163 F. Supp. 924, 929 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). However, use of local counsel
may effect considerable saving. Where local counsel is not available, the court under
Rule 30(b) may order that depositions be taken only upon written interrogatories.
As the number of long-distance witnesses increases, the greater is the saving from
employing depositions other than personal appearances.
14 "[A]ny court recognizes that a 'live' witness' testimony is better than testi-
mony by deposition." Bank of America v. Loew's Int'l Corp., supra note 13; see
Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F2d 464, 469-70 (2d Cir. 1946).
15 See cases cited note 8 supra.
16The tendency to minimize the value of depositions-"there is no need for us
to expatiate on the relative ineffectiveness of depositions or interrogatories in con-
troverting eye-witness testimony," Nuzzo v. Rederi A/S Wallenco, 325 F.2d 994,
995 (2d Cir. 1963),--makes insufficient allowance for their probable value in weighing
testimony of witnesses other than the deponent. In the present case, for example,
plaintiff's testimony on his own behalf was vital to his cause. Instant case at 364.
A jury wavering as to his credibility might have been strongly influenced by a depo-
sition, "dead" but neutral as to demeanor, advancing a different version of the event.
While the court, prefering live testimony, may regret its inability to procure it because
of the subpoena limit, a party may benefit from utilization of deposition testimony in
place of a witness whose "live" appearance for some reason may not be credibly
persuasive.
17 Instant case at 363.
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cretion, 18 introduction of a discretionary element necessarily unsettles an
otherwise fixed process.
The instant case illustrates the difficulty of effecting justice by un-
guided discretion 19 through the manipulation of taxation. After the first
trial, Judge Palmieri allowed travel expenses in excess of $3,700 for three
witnesses from Saudi Arabia who testified as to Aramco's contention that
plaintiff had been discharged "for cause." 20 Judge Weinfeld, at the second
trial, also acting upon "discretion," as to the same witnesses testifying on the
same issues,2 1 found no reason to compensate Aramco for their traveling
expenses.2 2 The majority of the Second Circuit found that Judge Weinfeld
had abused his discretion in overruling expenses taxed by the first judge,23
but that Judge Palmieri had erred originally in allowing more than $2,000
18 Where other issues are raised, courts will review for possible abuse of dis-
cretion that part of the judgment relating to costs. Chemical Bank & Trust Co. v.
Prudence-Bonds Corp., 207 F.2d 67, 77-78 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S.
904 (1954); Chicago Sugar Co. v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 176 F.2d 1, 11 (7th
Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 948 (1950). While review of particular items of
cost will not generally be permitted, a judgment solely for costs is appealable where
abuse of discretion is charged. See, e.g., instant case at 361-62; Lichter Foundation
v. Welch, 269 F.2d 142 (6th Cir. 1959).
19 The need for effective guidance where the judge is given broad discretion has
long been recognized in England, where a system substantially opposite to that of
the American rule prevails. There successful parties may recover virtually all ex-
penses of litigation. See Metcalfe, Discretion in the Matter of Costs, 108 L.J. 725
(1958). Such discretion is theoretically guided by statute law, see, e.g., Supreme
Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 49, § 50(1), and
governed by rule, 1959 R. Sup. CT. 0. 65, r. 6.
20 Witness Faddoul testified that plaintiff before performing an operation had
not received from him the patient's laboratory reports, as required by company rules
and "accepted medical practice." Brief for Defendant, pp. 8, 9, 53a. Witness Swan-
son testified that she informed plaintiff that she would not act as anesthetist since
the results of the laboratory tests had not been received, but that plaintiff without
replying simply administered the anesthesia himself. Id. at 54a-55a. Witness Page
was a member of defendant's medical staff and testified to rebut a charge of "frameup"
in firing plaintiff. Id. at 11.
21 All three witnesses also appeared at the second trial. Brief for Defendant,
pp. 41a-43a. Thus, both judges had equal opportunity to hear them and to evaluate
the need for their live appearance. Judge Weinfeld, however, was able additionally
to consider the case in the light of the complicated developments following Judge
Palmieri's original direction of the verdict. (These were: judgment rev'd, 277 F2d
46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 824 (1960), order directing plaintiff to post
security against costs, action dismissed upon failure to provide the security, order
rev'd, 285 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1960).) Judge Palmieri does not appear to have "had
the greater opportunity to assess the necessity" of expenses for witnesses in the
first trial, instant case at 364, as the court maintained in finding that Judge Weinfeld
exceeded his discretion by determining de novo the costs previously allowed.
22Judge Weinfeld found the sums taxed by Judge Palmieri "entirely dispropor-
tionate to the sum involved" in the action and hence "unreasonable." 31 F.R.D.
191, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). Therefore, he did not reach the question of the 100-mile
limitation.
23 The court stated that the sensitive nature of judicial discretion makes it
inappropriate for a second judge independently to set aside costs taxed by the first
judge, at least where the preceding court had the greater opportunity to evaluate
the need for the costs incurred in the action before it. Instant case at 364. While
the court did not offer to its trial judges specific guidance as to situations appropriate
for the taxation of full transportation expenses, see note 25 infra, its language lends
itself to the interpretation that generally in actions requiring more than one trial
it is an abuse of discretion for judges at a later hearing to alter expenses taxed at
an earlier stage. See instant case at 364.
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for two witnesses who flew from Saudi Arabia to New York in unoccupied
space in company planes.2 4 With three courts' "discretion" resulting in
three variant awards, predictability under the new rule is impossible.2
Furthermore, taxation of such amount against a former-employee
plaintiff certainly is not calculated to encourage suits in such controver-
sies. 26 It is thus counter to the principle of unimpeded access to the courts
underlying the basic American policy that each party should bear his own
expenses
2
24 Ibid. It is unsophisticated cost allocation, however, to conclude that since
Aramco incurred no out-of-pocket expenses it cost nothing to bring these witnesses
from Saudi Arabia to New York. The pro rata assignment of air transportation
expense by Aramco to these witnesses was legitimate and was considerably lower
than the corresponding cost of commercial air travel. Opinion of Palmieri, J., Feb. 9,
1960, as reported in Brief for Defendant, p. 38a. Thus, the dissent contended that
to be consistent in abrogating the 100-mile rule the majority should have sustained
Judge Palmieri's taxation of this expense. Instant case at 369. But accounting pro-
cedures need not determine judicial discretion: the company comptroller's standards
for allocable expenses are not controlling on the judiciary.
2ZIn Nuzzo v. Rederi A/S Wallenco, 325 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1963), decided shortly
after the instant case, the Second Circuit reversed a trial judge's "discretionary"
refusal to tax the air fare of a witness brought from Sweden. The per curiam opinion
suggests to the trial courts no overall standards for taxation of witnesses' transpor-
tation expenses but insists that a party is entitled not to "be entirely frozen to depo-
sitions." Id. at 996. If this implies an absolute rule applicable to all cases, the
assurance given in the instant case that a trial judge will be left free to tax travel
expenses "according to the circumstances of each case," instant case at 363, has
already been abrogated. If not, the reversal without guidance indicates that trial
judge "discretion" is not likely to be free of appellate scrutiny. The substitution of
a discretionary for an "as of course" procedure promises added litigation not limited
to the trial level.
26 Because of the possible harmful effect on the company's entire employment
program in Saudi Arabia, Aramco would have met "any cost" to disprove plaintiff's
charges that he had been fired for refusing to conceal an alleged incidence of trachoma
among American employees in Saudi Arabia. Brief for Defendant, pp. 4, 6. The
amount plaintiff sued for was immaterial. Id. at 6. In fact, plaintiff originally sued
in the New York Supreme Court for $4,000. Reply Brief for Defendant, p. 3.
Although the total amount ultimately sought was $160,000, Aramco's willingness to
spare no expense, for what it considered valid business reasons, was thus based partly
on nonevidentiary considerations.
.27 Discouragement of litigation by threatening plaintiff with possible heavy ex-
penses is no innovation. In the ancient Athenian "private suits" (dikai), roughly
but not exactly equivalent to our civil actions, see, e.g., JONES, LAW & LEGAL THEORY
OF THE GREEKS 116-19 (1956); PRINGSHEIM, THE GREEK LAW OF SALE 1-3 (1950),
a litigant who failed to capture one-fifth of the total votes of the jurors was obligated
to pay one-sixth the amount sued for. See LOFBERO, SYNCOPHANCY IN ATHENS 87-89
(1917); 2 BONNER & SMITH, ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTIcE FROM HOMER TO ARISTOTLE
80, 87, 89 (1938), and for the original sources, PoLLux, VIII.39, HARPocATxroN,
s.v. epibelia. Athens in the fourth century B.C. was so fully committed to the
principle of open access to her courts and encouragement of litigation that delays of
many years in the adjudication of private suits were common. See CHARLES, STATUTES
OF LIMITATIONS AT ATHENS 9-10 (1938). Thus, the threatened one-sixth fine, the
so-called eptbelia, clearly was intended to deter rash litigation in bad faith, the
situation about which the Second Circuit was disturbed in the present case. The
plaintiff's subjection to this cost was often mentioned by plaintiffs in seeking a
favorable jury verdict. When the great fourth century orator and statesman
Demosthenes attempted to recover from his guardians the estate left to him in their
trust by his father, he pleaded with the jurors: "Seeking now to recover my own
property, I have come into the greatest danger. For if the defendant prevails-and
this let Heaven forbid !-I will be assessed one-sixth costs, 100 minae. . . . Thus
I beg you, jurors, I beseech you, I implore you: Remember the law and your sacred
oaths, do justice by me, and give my pleas the same consideration as his." 27
DEMOSTHENES 67-68 (The Speech Against Aphobos).
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Although the defendant in the present case was far more capable of
bearing the costs of litigation, the court was concerned with the possibility
of a defendant incurring large expenses "even if he has come into court
only to defend against an unjust accusation." 28 Defendant emphasized
plaintiff's "lies" as the cause of its large transportation expenses for wit-
nesses.2 9  Good faith is thus central-merely failing to carry the burden
of persuasion should not be reason for penalizing a good-faith litigant.30
Under rule 37(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,31 a party
denying without "good reasons" any fact "of substantial importance" may
be ordered to pay its opponent's reasonable expenses for proving the fact,
"including reasonable attorney's fees." This provision, applicable only
after a request under rule 36 32 to admit the "truth of any matters of
fact," 3 3 is available for precisely the situation about which the Second Cir-
28 Instant case at 363.
29 Brief for Defendant, p. 7.
30 See Andresen v. Clear Ridge Aviation, Inc., 9 F.R.D. 50 (D. Neb. 1949)
(action to enjoin airport operation; defendant on prevailing not entitled to expenses
for sound films and expert witnesses); cf. Chicago Sugar Co. v. American Sugar
Ref. Co., 176 F.2d 1, 11 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 948 (1950) (defendant
not liable to assessment for one-half costs before master in antitrust treble-damage
suit).
31 If a party, after being served with a request under Rule 36 to admit the
genuineness of any documents or the truth of any matters of fact, serves a
sworn denial thereof and if the party requesting the admissions thereafter
proves the genuineness of any such document or the truth of any such matter
of fact, he may apply to the court for an order requiring the other party to
pay him the reasonable expenses incurred in making such proof, including
reasonable attorney's fees. Unless the court finds that there were good
reasons for the denial or that the admissions sought were of no substantial
importance, the order shall be made.
32 The courts have not fully utilized rule 36. See Developments in the Law
-Discovery, 74 HARv. L. Rav. 940, 968 (1961). Its basic application, to free parties
from proving facts not in dispute, is often better met by stipulation between counsel.
Nonetheless, large awards have been made under combined rules 36 and 37(c). E.g.,
Akins v. McKnight, 13 F.R.D. 9 (N.D. Ohio 1952) ($3,500 was awarded). Ap-
plicability of the rule to situations such as that in the instant case would involve no
abrupt departure from its past use. While many courts have held "disputability"
to be a valid objection to a request for admission under rule 36, e.g., Syracuse Broad-
casting Corp. v. Newhouse, 271 F.2d 910, 917 (2d Cir. 1959), the rule's textual
language does not limit it to undisputed matters. Numerous cases hold "disput-
ability" no basis for objection to a request for admission. E.g., McGonigle v. Baxter,
27 F.R.D. 504 (E.D. Pa. 1961); United States v. Ehbauer, 13 F.R.D. 462 (W.D.
Mo. 1952). Academic commentators have argued that expeditious procedure de-
mands its application to "disputed" matters. See Finman, The Requests for Admis-
sions in Federal Civil Procedure, 71 YALE L.J. 371, 394-402 (1962). In the instant
case, for example, the defendant might have asked plaintiff to admit that he had not
received the results of the laboratory tests before operating. Upon denial, the expense
of bringing witness Faddoul from Beirut, Lebanon, to testify to nonreceipt, Brief for
Defendant, pp. 8, 9, 53a, might then have been charged to the plaintiff under rule
37(c), especially since he had himself previously deposed as to nonreceipt, but had
recanted at the first trial. Brief for Defendant, p. 8. Conversely, if the court found
the plaintiff not "without reasons" in denying the request, he would not be charged
with Faddoul's expenses.
33 Requests may not be directed to a matter of opinion, Water Hammer Arrester
Corp. v. Tower, 7 F.R.D. 620 (E.D. Wis. 1947), nor to a question of law, Tyler
State Bank & Trust Co. v. Bullington, 179 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1950). The "ultimate
issue" must be avoided. Id. at 760. But even when "negligence" is controverted, for
example, specific points probative of the ultimate issue may be undisputed. Thus, in
Jackson Buff Corp. v. Marcelle, 20 F.R.D. 139 (E.D.N.Y. 1957), the issue as developed
in the pleadings concerned plaintiff's exemption from taxes, yet many facts pertinent.
to taxability were established through admissions. See Finman, supra note 32, at 375.
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cuit was concerned,3 4 that of bad-faith litigation exposing the opponent to
considerable expense. Providing full compensation including the attorney's
fee, "usually the largest single expense of litigation," 35 seems preferable to
an abolition of the long-established 100-mile limitation on taxation of wit-
nesses' travel expenses. The use of rule 37(c) will avoid confusion in the
taxation of costs, allowing transportation expenses to be taxed "as of
course." Its direction to unreasonable denials limits its application to
situations in which good faith in bringing suit is affirmatively challenged.
A mere failure to discharge the burden of persuasion will not subject a
litigant to heavy taxation. In view of the potential availability of rules 36
and 37 in cases of unjust accusations the maintenance of the 100-mile limita-
tion on taxation of travel expenses would appear to work no undue hardship.
GUARDIAN & WARD-PARTAL DISTRIBUTION OF INCOMPE-
TENT'S ESTATE APPROVED To REDUCE CONTEmPLATED TAXEs ON
His DEATH
Irenee duPont 1 made substantial gifts to his children and grandchildren
over the years and planned through additional gifts to them to reduce his
42 million dollar estate to about 30 million dollars. In 1949, however, the
duPont-General Motors antitrust litigation intervened and apparently
deterred him from maldng further gifts. During this prolonged litigation,
which terminated in 1962, duPont became totally and permanently in-
capacitated. In 1963, his guardians petitioned the Delaware Court of
Chancery for authorization to distribute 36.6 million dollars 3 of his estate,
then worth 176 million dollars, to his children and grandchildren through an
inter vivos trust in order to save at least an estimated 16.7 million dollars in
taxes that would be imposed if the property passed through his estate. Even
greater savings would accrue if the gift were not held to be in contemplation
of death.4 Although a present gift, the apportionment requested otherwise
34 See text accompanying note 28 supra; cf. note 27 supra.
3 5Instant case at 363.
1 Irenee duPont died on December 19, 1963, at the age of 86, about two months
after the court handed down its decree. Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, Dec. 19,
1963, p. 1. col. 2.
2 The distribution was to be made from the stock of Christiana Securities Co.,
whose assets consisted mainly of duPont common stock. The litigation itself reached
the United States Supreme Court twice. United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours
& Co., 366 U.S. 316 (1961); United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353
U.S. 586 (1957).
See Record, vol. 1, p. 47, United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353
U.S. 586 (1957).
3 The figures given by the court in the instant case are less exact than those given
in the Report of the Amicus Curiae. This Comment, therefore, will use the figures
of the Amicus Curiae.
4Were the inter vivos distribution not made, the incompetent's taxable estate
after deductions would have been $135,200,000, on which the federal estate taxes
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followed the terms of the incompetent's will. The court approved the pro-
posed distribution, which was unopposed, because the incompetent had
intended such an inter vivos disbursement prior to his incapacitation and the
balance remaining in his estate was more than adequate to maintain him in
his accustomed manner. In re duPont, 194 A.2d 309 (Del. Ch. 1963).
The substitution-of-judgment doctrine has traditionally permitted
courts of equity 5 to award periodic payments from the assets 6 of an in-
competent to his needy relatives, even though he has no legal duty to
succor them. In theory, the court stands in the shoes of the incompetent
and inquires whether he himself would have given assistance under the
circumstances; yet it obviously must protect the interests of the incompetent
and will insure that sufficient property remains to sustain him as his station
in life requires. 7 Despite language in many opinions that the doctrine ought
to be employed sparingly,8 it has on occasion been applied to benefit
charities" and nonrelatives to whom the incompetent owed a moral obliga-
tion.10  The present case appears to be the first to apply the substitution
would have been $102,500,000. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2001. If the gift were
made, the entire estate would be reduced by $58,300,000, for along with the gift of
$36,600,000, approximately $21,100,000 would have to be expended for the gift tax
under INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2502(a) and the remaining amount would be required
for other expenses. The taxable estate would then be reduced from $135,200,000 to
about $76,900,000 with an estimated estate tax of $57,600,000 under § 2001 unless the
gift were held to be in contemplation of death under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2035.
See note 1 supra. If it were so held, the $36,600,000 would be added to the taxable
estate. Although a credit under § 2012 would be given for the $21,100,000 in gift taxes
already paid, an extra $7,100,000 would be incurred because the estate tax rates are
higher than those of the gift tax. The estate taxes would then total about $64,700,000.
This amount plus the $21,100,000 already paid as gift taxes would be $16,700,000 less
than the $102,500,000 that would be incurred if there were no inter vivos distribution.
Report of the Amicus Curiae, pp. 101-02. See also LowNDES & KRAMER, FEDERAL
ESTATE AND GrTr TAXES § 5.13 (2d ed. 1962).
5 In Delaware, the Court of Chancery has general supervision over incompetents.
See In the Matter of Bohnstedt, 36 Del. Ch. 97, 125 A.2d 580 (Ch. 1956) ; In the
Matter of Reeves, 10 Del. Ch. 324, 92 AtI. 246 (Ch. 1914), aff'd, 10 Del. Ch. 483, 94
Atl. 511 (Sup. Ct 1915); DE.. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 3701, 3705, 3914(d) (Supp.
1962).
6Most of the payments under the substitution-of-judgment doctrine have come
from the income of the incompetent's assets rather than from principal. The courts
are reluctant to disburse corpus undoubtedly because any such disposition seems a
more permanent reduction of his property and, in some cases, more likely to injure
ultimate beneficiaries under his will. In re Bond, 198 Misc. 256, 98 N.Y.S.2d 81
(Sup. Ct. 1950); In re Fleming's Estate, 173 Misc. 851, 19 N.Y.S.2d 234 (Sup. Ct
1940). But see 25 Am. JUR. Guardian & Ward § 79 (1940) (citing no cases). The
present case unequivocally declares that distribution may be made from principal.
Instant case at 317.
7E.g., Ex parte Whitbread, 2 Mer. 99, 35 Eng. Rep. 878 (Ch. 1816); see Re
Mackenzie, 43 L.T.R. (n.s.) 681 (C.A. 1880) (size of payments reduced to protect
the incompetent). Some states do not recognize the doctrine mainly because the
power does not derive from the common law, and no enabling statute exists in the
jurisdiction. See In re Beilstein, 145 Ohio St. 397, 62 N.E.2d 205 (1945) ; Binney v.
Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 43 RI. 222, 239-40, 110 Atl. 615, 622 (1920).
s See, e.g., instant case at 317; In re Johnson, 111 N.J. Eq. 268, 162 At. 96
(Ch. 1932); In re Bond, 198 Misc. 256, 98 N.Y.S.2d 81 (Sup. Ct. 1950); In the
Matter of Blair, 1 My. & Cr. 300, 40 Eng. Rep. 390 (Ch. 1836).
9 In re Strickland, L.R. 6 Ch. 225 (1871) (contributions toward the building of
a local church and schools approved).
10 See In re Whitaker, 42 Ch. D. 119 (1889) ; In the Matter of the Earl of
Carysfort, Cr. & Ph. 76, 41 Eng. Rep. 418 (Ch. 1840) (pension to an old retainer
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of judgment doctrine to reduce the corpus for the sole purpose of saving
contemplated estate taxes." A Pennsylvania trial court,12 apparently the
only other court to have considered this issue, stated that "tax avoidance"
is not an adequate reason to distribute an incompetent's assets before his
demise. In that case, however, there was no evidence that the individual
intended to make an inter vivos distribution; in fact, the few thousand
dollars involved had accumulated after he became incapacitated. 13
The major factor militating against application of this doctrine is the
speculative determination of the incompetent's probable intent, which will
be the basis of any alteration of the estate plan in his will. There also
exists a risk that he may recover and wish to change his testamentary dis-
positions 14 or that a beneficiary might die between a distribution and the
incompetent's death and thus thwart his intent as expressed in his will by
depriving surviving beneficiaries of the larger share to which they would
have been entitled if no inter vivos transfers had occurred.' 5 Certainly if
there is strong proof of probable intent,16 such as in the case of an incom-
peterit who actually intended to part with some of his assets and became
incapacitated shortly thereafter, or one who was aiding an impoverished
relative at the time of his incapacitation, the hazards are minimized and the
court should act. Otherwise, the court must weigh more carefully the
circumstantial proof of putative intent. Some courts, for example, have
based distributions bn evidence of what a reasonable man would do under
the circumstances. 17 Furthermore, some kinds of distribtitions benefit
society, and this consideration might be determinative in a close case.
approved). In Whitaker, the decedent was in the process of changing his will to make
the petitioner the major beneficiary instead of Mr. Whitaker when he was seized
with an attack of "angina pectoris" and died. Mr. Whitaker decided to effect, at
least partially, the last-minute intention of the deceased and gave the petitioner ari
unenforceable promissory note for f50,000. He became a lunatic before he had paid
all of the installments, but the court enforced the note. There is no indication from
the case that the recipient would have been a beneficiary under Mr. Whitaker's will.
11 Cf. City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. McGowan, 323 U.S. 594, 595-97 (1945).
Money was paid from income to the ward's daughters who were not in need. How-
ever, the incompetent had annually given them large allowances before she had
become incapacitated, with no apparent motive to avoid taxes.
12 Bullock Estate, 10 Pa. D. & C.2d 682 (Delaware County Orphans' Ct. 1957).
13 Id. at 684.
14Id. at 685.
'5 Accord, Bullock Estate, 10 Pa. D. & C.2d 682, 685 (Delaware County Orphans'
Ct. 1957). For example, if the ward bequeathed all his property equally to his two
brothers if both survive him and if only one survive him, that one should take all,
this testamentary scheme would be destroyed if the other brother died between the
distribution and the ward's death. Such an award might be made conditional upon
each brother's surviving the ward.
16 One case called for proof beyond a reasonable doubt taf the incompetent
would have made the gift, but that case has since been modified. Generally, the
standard of proof is that of a preponderance of the evidence. Compare It re Flagler,
130 Misc. 554, 224 N.Y. Supp. 27 (Sup. Ct. 1926), with In re Kernochan, 84 Misc.
565, 146 N.Y. Supp. 1026 (Sup. Ct. 1914).
17 E.g., Potter v. Berry, 53 N.J. Eq. 151, 32 Atl. 259 (Cf. Err. & App. 1895);
it re Bond, 198 Misc. 256, 98 N.Y.S.2d 81 (Sup. Ct. 1950); In re Fleming's Estate,
173 Misc. 851, 19 N.Y.S.2d 234 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Hambleton's Appeal, 102 Pa. 50
(1883) ; Ex parte Whitbread, 2 Mer. 99, 35 Eng. Rep. 878 (Ch. 1816).
1964]
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In the absence of proof of prior specific intent, the strongest case for
inter vivos distribution exists when relatives are in need, for such distribu-
tions benefit not only the recipients but society as well. They help to keep
the individual donee from becoming a public charge and help to preserve
the self-respect of the incompetent's family. In such situations, courts need
only require a showing that it is more probable than not that a reasonable
man would have responded to the appeal.' 8 The presence of a bequest in
the incompetent's will to the prospective donee enhances the probability
that the incompetent would have responded. If the gift is to an heir or a
legatee, it might be considered as an advancement or a satisfaction of the
ultimate legacy.' 9 Otherwise, the distribution will necessarily penalize the
incompetent's testamentary beneficiaries or his heirs. Nevertheless, proof
should not be required that the incompetent had intended to benefit the
donee under his will or had succored him in the past, because the mis-
fortune may have occurred after the incompetent had executed his will or
after he had become incompetent.20
Grants to charitable or analogous organizations may also have social
utility and help to relieve a burden that would otherwise be imposed upon
the community, but contributions should obviously be limited to those
causes in which the incompetent had been interested in the past. The
amount of the gifts is more difficult to determine in this situation than in
the case of an individual because the need of an institution may not be
definitely ascertainable. One way this problem has been resolved has been
to prohibit the trustee or guardian from donating to eleemosynary causes
more than ten percent of the gross income of the estate for the preceding
year.21  Whether or not there is a statutory limit, contributions should
never exceed the limits indicated by the past practice of the incompetent.
In the case of a moral obligation unaccompanied by need,2 such as
an unenforceable promise to make a gift, there is little or no social benefit
derived from distribution. In fact, to succeed at all in his claim, the
1sIn re Flagler, 130 Misc. 375, 224 N.Y. Supp. 30 (Sup. Ct. 1927). But cf. In re
Beilstein, 145 Ohio St. 397, 62 N.E.2d 205 (1945).
'9 See In re Fleming's Estate, 173 Misc. 851, 855, 19 N.Y.S.2d 234, 238 (Sup.
Ct. 1940); In the Matter of Willoughby, 11 N.Y. Ch. Rep. 257, 259 (1844). Under
the doctrine of advancements, an inter vivos gift to an heir is considered part of the
distributive share to which he will be entitled on the death of the donor. This doc-
trine applies when the donor dies intestate, and is usually invoked in the parent-child
situation, in which it is presumed that a parent will treat all of his children equally,
absent evidence to the contrary. LF-ciC, CASES ON WILLS 9-15 (2d ed. 1960). The
same result and rationale exists under the satisfaction of legacies doctrine when the
donor dies testate. Id. at 168-70.
20 The amount given to an individual should be measured by his accustomed
living standard rather than by a bare subsistence test. See In re Beridge, 50 L.T.R.
(n.s.) 653 (C.A. 1884) (petitioner received 700 to raise his income to £1000) ; In
the Matter of Blair, 1 My. & Cr. 300, 40 Eng. Rep. 390 (Ch. 1836) (petitioner received
£300 to raise his income to 600) ; Note, 8 HAav. L. REv. 472, 489 (1895).
21 D.L. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3710 (Supp. 1962).
22 Compare In the Matter of the Earl of Carysfort, Cr. & Ph. 76, 41 Eng. Rep.
418 (Ch. 1840). Although this case involved a nonfamilial moral obligation in that
it approved a pension to an old retainer, it is similar to the needy relative cases.
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prospective donee must show some prior intent of the incompetent to make
a grant during his lifetime.23 If he can show by a pteponderance of the
evidence that the* incompetent had planned to honor this obligation, the
court should not defeat this prior wish if convinced that the likelihood of
recovery is small. If there is any substantial chance that the incompetent
will regain his faculties, it is preferable that he make the gift himself since
little or no social urgency exists.
Although no social benefit is likely from early distribution to an in-
competent's beneficiaries in order to avoid anticipated estate taxes, there
is no reason not to distribute when three separate criteria can be met. First,
it must be shown that a reasonable man would have responded to the
petition. Most people warit to reduce their taxes, atid it thus seems safe to
assume, absent indications to the contrary, that the incompetent would wish
an early distribution to his beneficiaries so long as his own way of life is
not jeopardized. It should also be demonstrated that the terms of his will
would be closely followed except for the time of disposition. In the case
of need or moral obligation, this factor is not primary since intent is deter-
mined by other elements such as a ptomissory note or the day-to-day rela-
tionship of the incompetent and the recipient. Finally, as with moral
obligations, it should always be shown by cleat and convincing evidence that
the incompetent will not recover his faculties, for then there is little risk
that he will change the final apportionment of his property by a new will.
Furthermore, it is desirable to avoid the likelihood that the incompetent will
actually recover and find part of his estate permatently alienated and in
the hands of beneficiaries who are not in want. When he has a fair chance
of recovery, the need for relief of impoverished relatives or of charities can-
not as readily be postponed; but when a tax savings plan is the motive, there
is less justification for judicial action.
There is no question of the right of Irenee duPont, had he been com-
petent, to make inter vivos gifts in order to save estate and inheritance
taxes.2 4  However, by reducing the amount that the federal government
would receive if the property passed under the will, a state court arguably
offends federal tax policy. City Batik Farmers Trust Co. v. McGowan 25
presented the question whether certain transfers that a'state court permitted
from the estate of an incompetent to her children, who were not in financial
distress, were gifts in contemplation of death for federal tax purposes. The
Supreme Court of the United States declared in resolving this mattet,
"where, as in New York, the court is to substitute itself as nearly as may
be for the incompetent, and to act upon the same motives and considera-
tions as would have moved her, the transfer is, in legal effect, her act and
the motive is hers." 26
23 See In re Whitaker, 42 Ch. D. 119 (1889).
24 Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 365 (1960) (dictum); Gregory v.
Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935) ; INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2035(b).
25323 U.S. 594 (1945).
26The Court rejected the argument that an incompetent cannot form a testa-
mentary intent and that therefore, the gift should not be taxed as a gift in contem-
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Although it is unclear whether the McGowan distribution was
motivated for tax reasons, since the incompetent had made annual dis-
tributions before her incapacitation, the Court did not intimate that any
impropriety had occurred. This view seems correct: the need to have
flexible management of the estate of incompetents outweighs the federal tax
loss, and in any event, federal tax policy sanctions the tax planning of
estates.
The present case is correctly decided since it meets the suggested
criteria for distribution 2 7 and does no violence to federal-state relations.
In fact, it is a particularly strong case for distribution since the incompetent
himself had intended for tax reasons to transfer a large portion of his estate
during his lifetime.2 The incompetent's interests are not prejudiced, and
those who are the objects of his bounty receive even greater benefits than
would otherwise accrue to them. The Pennsylvania decision,2° on the other
hand, is unsatisfactory insofar as it lays down a blanket rule against inter
vivos transfers to save estate taxes.
plation of death under any circumstances. The Court acted instead on the basis of
the incompetent's presumed intent. Id. at 598-99. See also LOWNDES & KRAMER,
op. cit. mspra note 4, § 5.10.
27 Instant case at 310, 311, 317.
2 8 Id. at 311.
29 Bullock Estate, 10 Pa. D. & C.2d 682 (Delaware County Orphans' Ct. 1957);
see text accompanying note 12, supra.
